Uncertainty Probability and Non-Classical Logic

by Brian Weatherson.

This is a contribution to the debate about what are the constraints on rational credences. I’ll start by introducing two of the parties to that debate, each of whom will be somewhat stylised and given a somewhat contentious label. The classical Bayesian says that it is a condition of coherence that one’s credences be governed by the probability calculus. That is, if Cr is an agent’s credence function, the function from propositions to the agent’s credence in that proposition, the agent is coherent iff there is some probability function Pr such that Cr(A) = Pr(A). The heretic objects to the classical Bayesian because she thinks the following is possible for a coherent agent: there is a proposition A such Cr(A) and Cr(¬A) are both low. By ‘low’ she really means arbitrarily low, but to get the debate started she can just mean less than 0.5. [via]

http://brian.weatherson.org/upn.pdf...

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Uncertainty Probability and Non-Classical Logic (2004)

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